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Abstract 
 
 The end of the Cold War has sparked considerable academic and policy debates 
on the direction and aims of US foreign policy. One aspect of that debate has centered on 
the role of ethnic groups in influencing foreign policy and determining the national 
interest. Two broad camps are visible in this debate. The first camp argues that ethnic 
lobbies are highly influential and a threat to US foreign policy and the national interest 
(Schlesinger, Jr.: 1992; Huntington: 1997; Smith: 2000). The second camp sees these 
groups as moderately influential but largely beneficial; specifically, they promote 
American interests abroad (Clough: 1992; Shain: 1999). Neither of these camps, despite 
their conclusions, has offered rigorous case studies aimed at measuring the impact of 
ethnic lobby groups on the US foreign policy process nor divulging how these groups 
attain their alleged influence. 
One US minority in particular, Armenian-Americans, has achieved considerable 
success in gaining political and material support from Congress. Such achievements 
include roughly $90 million in annual aid for the state of Armenia; maintenance of 
Section 907 of the Freedom of Support Act, which blocks aid to Armenia’s rival 
Azerbaijan; the stalling of an arms deal with Turkey; and increased support for official 
US governmental recognition of the Armenian genocide of 1915-1921. 
This case study of Armenian lobby groups in the US argues that the amount of aid 
and support for Armenia and Armenian issues is best explained by the intense lobbying 
efforts of Armenian-Americans in the United States. The lobbying success of this small 
US minority is largely the result of two factors: an intense inter-community rivalry 
between two factions within the Armenian-American population, which has led to hyper-
mobilization of this ethnic group’s resources, and the formation of key alliances in 
Washington including members of Congress and other lobby groups and organizations.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Divided They Conquer:  
The Success of Armenian Ethnic Lobbies in the US1 
Heather S. Gregg2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Within the last decade, Armenians lobby groups in the United States have 
achieved considerable success in gaining political and material support from Congress. 
Such achievements include roughly $90 million in annual aid for the state of Armenia, 
maintenance of Section 907 of the Freedom of Support Act, which blocks aid to 
Armenia’s rival Azerbaijan, the stalling of an arms deal with Turkey, and increased 
support for official US government recognition of the Armenian genocide of 1915-1922. 
 
The degree of Congressional support to the republic of Armenia and Armenian 
issues is surprising. Armenians number only around 1 million in the United States and, 
although concentrated in states such as Massachusetts and California, their voting impact 
is moderate relative to other ethnic groups. 3  Furthermore, US national interests towards 
the Caucuses do not suggest that Armenia is the most important state to target in that 
region. Azerbaijan, the country with which Armenia has an active land and border 
dispute, holds oil and natural gas reserves in addition to a passage for transport of these 
fuels to Turkey, a littoral state. Turkey, a historic and contemporary foe of the 
Armenians, is a regionally important NATO member and US ally. In addition, Armenia 
has received considerable US aid despite waves of undemocratic practices, such as 
banning political parties, media censorship, and the occupation of 10% of Azerbaijan, not 
including the Armenian exclave of Nargorno Karabakh. 4 It, therefore, is hard to argue 
that Washington supports Armenia as a reward for its democratic and human rights 
                                                 
1 The Rosemary Rogers Working Paper Series, and the research upon which they are based, are supported 
by a generous grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.  
2 Heather S. Gregg is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at MIT, focusing on International Relations 
and Security Studies. Please address correspondence to Heather S. Gregg, The Center for International 
Studies, E38-600, MIT, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139; email: hsgregg@mit.edu.  The 
author would like to thank the Mellon Foundation for its generous financial support of this research, the 
executive committee of the Mellon-MIT Program on NGO’s and Forced Migration for its encouragement 
on this project, and Sharon Stanton Russell for her comments throughout the research and drafting of this 
paper. 
3 Statistics on the number of Armenian in the US vary greatly. For example, Khachig Tololyan puts the 
number at 800,000, “Elites and Institutions in the Armenian Diaspora,” Diaspora: A Journal of 
Transnational Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 107-136. Robert H. Hewsen cites the 1980 US 
census as recording only 308,096, Armenia: A Historical Atlas, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2001) plate 270. Yossi Shain places the number at around 1 million, Marketing the American Creed 
Abroad: US Diasporas and Homelands, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 64. Statistics 
on other ethnic groups in the US show how small Armenians are in comparison.  For example Shain 
outlines the rise of Mexican-American political activism in the US, an ethnic group that comprises a 
significant percentage of the US population (Shain: 1999, pp. 23-23 and chapter 5).  Shain hypothesizes 
that the size of the diasporic community does contribute to its success in attaining its political objectives 
pp. 9-10. Tony Smith also makes this point in Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the 
Making of American Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 95-101. 
4 David Rieff, “Case Study in Ethnic Conflict,” Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1997), pp. 118-126. 
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practices.  What, then, explains the degree of Washington’s interest in Armenia and 
Armenian issues?  
 
This paper argues that the amount of aid and support for Armenian issues is best 
explained by the intense lobbying efforts of Armenian-Americans in the United States. 
The lobbying success of this small ethnic minority is largely the result of two factors. 
First, an inter-community rivalry within the Armenian-American population represented 
by two lobby groups in Washington, the Armenian National Committee of America 
(ANCA) and the Armenian Assembly of America (the Assembly), has led to hyper-
mobilization of this ethnic group's resources. Their different approaches to lobbying have 
mobilized more Armenians than one organization alone and have doubled outreach 
projects and resources on Armenian issues, magnifying the Armenian presence in the US.  
Second, the Armenians have formed key alliances in Washington including members of 
Congress, other lobby groups and organizations, and the bipartisan Congressional Caucus 
on Armenian Issues in the House of Representatives, which has rallied behind Armenian 
policy objectives.  Together, hyper-mobilization and alliance building have allowed the 
Armenians considerable success in achieving specific policy objectives. 
 
The first section of this paper reviews literature on ethnic lobbies in the US. It 
argues that more case studies are needed to test hypotheses posited by scholars on the 
strategies and successes of ethnic lobbies in influencing US foreign policy. The second 
section traces the history of the schism within the Armenian-American community and 
highlights the history of Armenian political activism in the US. The third section 
describes the formation of Armenian ethnic lobbies, their methods of outreach to 
Armenian-Americans and the general public, and the policy objectives and strategies of 
the two Armenian lobby groups in the US, ANCA and the Assembly. The fourth section 
offers concluding remarks on what the Armenian case suggests about the impact of ethnic 
lobbies on US foreign policy in general. 
 
II. Literature on Ethnic Lobbies in the US 
  
The end of the Cold War has sparked intense academic and policy debates on the 
direction and aims of US foreign policy. One aspect of that debate has centered on the 
role of ethnic groups in influencing foreign policy and determining the national interest. 
Two broad camps are visible in this debate: those that see ethnic lobbies as highly 
influential and a threat to US foreign policy and the national interest, and those that see 
these groups as moderately influential but largely good, promoting American interests 
abroad. This section argues that both of these camps offer hypotheses on ethnic lobbies 
but provide no in-depth case studies to test these claims. Therefore more rigorous case 
studies are needed in order to measure the degree to which ethnic lobbies influence US 
foreign policy and how that influence is attained. 
 
The first camp on ethnic lobbies, headed by Samuel Huntington and Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., argues that the rise of US ethnic groups in the foreign policy arena stems 
from diversity within America’s population and is a threat to the national interest. 
Huntington asserts that the Cold War united the American people under the threat from a 
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common enemy, the Soviet Union. The passage of this foe has left American society and 
its government in a state of national “disintegration,” which, in turn, has thrown into 
question what our interests should be.5  This state of disintegration has been reinforced by 
post Cold War immigration to the US and the rise of “the cult of multiculturalism,” 
whose proponents “deny the existence of a common culture in the United States, 
denounce assimilation, and promote the primacy of racial, ethnic, and other subnational 
cultural identities and groupings.”6 The rise of ethnic lobbies in the US is an outgrowth of 
these international and domestic changes. Although Huntington acknowledges that the 
interests of ethnic lobbies can coincide with the national interest, he also claims that they 
are “often pursued at the expense of broader interests and American relations with long-
standing allies.”7  Ethnic lobbies, therefore, pose a threat to US foreign policy aims and 
articulation of the national interest. This viewpoint is echoed by Arthur M. Schlesinger, 
Jr.8 
 
Tony Smith offers a more nuanced yet equally as cautionary argument about 
ethnic lobbies in the US. Smith, like Huntington and Schlesinger Jr., posits that ethnic 
lobbies affect US foreign policy decision-making considerably and that their impact on 
the national interest may be more negative than positive.9 However, Smith looks not only 
at the ethnic composition of the US but also the structure of its political system as an 
explanation for how ethnic lobbies gain influence in Washington. Smith argues that “the 
structure of the American political system, as much as the character of particularistic 
social forces, explains the importance of ethnic groups in the formulation of American 
foreign policy.”10 Smith delineates three ways in which lobbies gain influence in 
Washington: through votes; campaign finance; and by creating an “organizational body” 
that articulates demands, mobilizes its constituents, and forms alliances with other 
groups.11 
 
The second camp, headed by Yossi Shain, contends that the rise of ethnic lobbies 
in post-Cold War US foreign policy-making is a good thing; it is a sign that these groups 
have achieved “a respectable position in American life today” and that they want to 
acquire, “a meaningful voice in US foreign affairs.”12  Shain argues that ethnic lobbies 
are useful for promoting US values back in the homeland: democracy, self-determination, 
human rights and other liberal values.13 For proponents of the “democratic peace 
                                                 
5 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of National Interests,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 1997) 
pp. 28-40. 
6 Huntington, pp. 31-32. 
7 Huntington, p. 35. 
8 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society (New York: 
WW Norton, 1992). 
9 Tony Smith, pp. 1-2. 
10 Smith, p. 86. Walker Connor also points to the structure of the US political system as important for 
explaining the influence of ethnic lobbies in “Diasporas and the Formation of Foreign Policy: The US in 
Comparative Perspective,” pp. 167-179, in Diasporas in World Politics: The Greeks in Comparative 
Perspective, edited by Dimitri C. Constas and Athanassios G. Platias (London: Macmillan in association 
with The Institute of International Relations, Panteion University, 1993). 
11 Smith, pp. 94-110. 
12 Shain, p. 25. 
13 Shain, chapters one and two. 
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theory”—the argument that liberal democracies do not fight each other and therefore the 
spread of democracy will create a “zone of peace” among like-nations—ethnic lobbies 
serve US interests by spreading democracy and thus peace.  
 
A slightly different variant of this argument is posited by Michael Clough. 14 He 
contends that US Cold War foreign policy was determined by a small group of elites but 
that the post-Cold war strategic environment, coupled with increases in immigration to 
the US and advances in communications, has opened foreign policy-making up to a wider 
body of the population, including ethnic groups. The rise of “grass roots” organizations in 
the foreign policy arena is not a threat to the national interest but rather the fulfillment of 
democratic participation in a nation’s destiny. These groups’ participation should be 
welcomed and accommodated by the US government, Clough argues. 
 
Whether ethnic lobbies are “good” or “bad” for articulating the national interest is 
difficult to measure by any objective standards. This debate, therefore, will not be 
addressed in this paper. Measuring the impact of ethnic lobbies on determining US 
foreign policy is a more plausible endeavor. Although, as most scholars of ethnic lobbies 
will contend, foreign policy-making is an over-determined process, it is very difficult to 
say with certainty what domestic and international factors cause foreign policy 
decisions.15 Nevertheless, the debate on ethnic lobbies and their impact on foreign policy 
can be advanced by delving into case studies on particular groups and by exploring the 
history and organization of specific ethnic lobbies, the agendas they set, and their 
strategies for realizing their objectives. 
 
There are almost no in-depth case studies on particular ethnic lobby groups in the 
US.16 The notable exception is research done on pro-Israel lobby groups, particularly the 
American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).17 Of particular importance to the 
debate on how ethnic lobbies organize and influence the foreign policy process is David 
Howard Goldberg’s Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups.18 Goldberg’s research 
compares the rise of pro-Israel lobby groups in the US, particularly AIPAC, with the pro-
Israel force in Canada, the Canada-Israel Committee (CIC).  He considers the 
organization of the lobby groups, their ties to Israel and to pro-Israel constituencies in the 
US and Canada, leadership within the lobbies, the policy-making processes of the US and 
                                                 
14 Michael Clough, “Grass-Roots Policymaking: Say Good-Bye to the ‘Wise Men,’” Foreign Affairs 
(January/February, 1994) pp. 2-8. 
15 Smith, p. 124. 
16 There is an edited volume on Greek diasporas throughout the world that touches on Greek lobbies, 
Diasporas in World Politics: The Greeks in Comparative Perspective, edited by Dimitri C. Constas and 
Athanassios G. Platias (London: Macmillan in association with The Institute of International Relations, 
Panteion University, 1993). In addition, both Yossi Shain and Tony Smith touch on numerous lobby groups 
in their books. But none of these works provides a rigorous case study of an ethnic lobby group.  
17 Works on the pro-Israel lobby include Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American 
Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), David Mittelberg, The Israel Connection and 
American Jews (Westport and London: Praeger, 1999), and Robert H. Trice, Interest Groups and the 
Foreign Policy Process: US Policy in the Middle East (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 
1976), to name a few. 
18 David Howard Goldberg, Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and Canadian Jews 
Lobby for Israel (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990). 
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Canadian governments, the networks these groups created, and their successes and 
failures in implementing their goals.  
 
This paper seeks to help fill the gap in the literature on ethnic lobbies by offering 
another case study, specifically by process-tracing the evolution of Armenian lobby 
groups in the US.  Following on Goldberg’s methodology, this paper will process-trace 
the organization of these lobby groups; the leadership they have; their ties to their 
diasporic constituents and to the Armenian government; and their objectives, strategies, 
successes and limits in attaining their goals.  
 
In addition, this paper will test the hypotheses of Smith and Shain on the impact 
of ethnic lobbies on US foreign policy. First, it will test Smith’s argument that ethnic 
lobbies gain influence through voting impact. Second, the paper will test Smith’s 
hypothesis on campaign finance by measuring the amount of Political Action Committee 
(PAC) contributions given by the Armenians relative to their adversaries. Third, it will 
test Smith’s hypothesis that ethnic groups gain influence by being organized, articulating 
clear demands, mobilizing their constituents, and forming alliances with other groups. 
Finally, this paper will test Shain’s hypothesis that there is a correlation between 
democratic practices and US aid. 
 
III. The Armenian Diaspora and Political Activism in the US 
 
The Armenian-American diaspora suffers from a politically motivated schism that 
has torn through virtually every aspect of the community’s life. This split, although 
present from the earliest days of the community in the US, has gone though waves of 
heightened animosity and relative calm. The result of the schism has been the 
construction of parallel organizations—churches, schools, newspapers, charities, social 
clubs and lobby groups—that remain divided to this day. 
  
The early Armenian-American community organized itself around political 
parties, which in turn shaped religious and social organizations. Four political parties 
were particularly important within the Armenian-American diaspora. The first party, 
formed in Geneva in 1887, was the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party. Initially this 
movement argued for independence of Armenia from Ottoman rule.19  The second 
movement, the Dashnaksutiun,20 or Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), was 
founded in Tiflis in 1890. This group initially called for reforms within the Ottoman 
system, not full independence.21 In 1910, the ARF became a political party and headed 
the government of the Republic of Armenia from May of 1918 until Armenia’s fall to the 
Red Army on December 2, 1920. The third movement was the Ramagavar Party, or the 
Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (ADL), which was formed in Egypt in 1921. The 
Ramagavars, composed primarily of businessmen and professionals, were supportive of 
                                                 
19 Akaby Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question, 1915-1923  (New York: St. Martins Press, 1984), 
p. 18, and Hratch Dasnabedian, “ARF History: The Realm of Ideas and the Evolution of Programmatic 
Objectives,” ARF website, http:/arf.am/English/history, downloaded (7/19/01). 
20 Also transliterated Tashnaksutiun. 
21 Nassibian, p. 18, and Dasnabedian, pp. 1-2. 
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Soviet occupation of Armenia; they believed that the Red Army would prevent further 
attacks from the Turks, thus preserving a portion of the Armenian homeland.22 The fourth 
party, the Armenian Progressive League, formed in US, was pro-communist in its 
ideology and argued that Soviet rule over Armenia would serve the region better than an 
independent state ruled by the ARF.23 
  
The political and ideological divisions within the Armenian community widened 
with the founding of the Republic of Armenia in 1918 and its fall to the Soviets in 1920. 
These developments created two camps within the Armenian-American community. 24 
The first camp consisted of the ARF, which formed the government of the Republic and 
was exiled with Soviet takeover. They espoused a staunch anti-Soviet, anticommunist 
rhetoric. The opposing camp consisted of the Hunchags, Ramagavars, and the Armenian 
Progressive League, which aligned against the ARF to support the Soviet take-over of the 
Republic, albeit for different ideological reasons.25  
 
These divergent political movements had an impact on religious organizations in 
the Armenian-American diaspora.26 The Protestant Armenians opposed revolution and 
banned pro-revolutionary rallies in their meeting houses, largely held by Apostolic 
(Orthodox) Armenians.27  This ideological division led to the founding of the first 
Armenian Apostolic Church in Worcester in 1891 and the founding of an “Armenian 
Academy” aimed at organizing pro-revolutionaries in the community. These opposing 
perspectives existed not only between denominations but within the Armenian Apostolic 
Church as well.  Tensions within the Apostolic Church culminated with the assassination 
of Archbishop Tourian on December 24, 1933, as he was conducting Mass in New York. 
Although never determined to be an ARF plot, two ARF members were convicted of 
murder and seven others tried as accomplices to the crime.28 The assassination split the 
Church in two, prompting the pro-ARF camp to establish its own Apostolic church, the 
                                                 
22 Jenny Phillips, Symbol, Myth, and Rhetoric: The Politics of Culture in an Armenian-American 
Population  (New York: AMS Press, 1989), p. 119. 
23 Phillips, p. 120. 
24Anny Bakalian, Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1993). Both Bakalian and Phillips describe the split as “pro- and anti-ARF (Tashnag).” 
Bakalian, p. 94 and Phillips, p. 119. 
25 Phillips, p. 119 and Bakalian, pp. 94-95. Bakalian argues that there was also a silent majority of neutrals, 
or chezok , that, although not playing into the partisan politics, still fell under the anti-Tashnag [ARF] 
banner, p. 95. 
26 Armenians, while all Christian, do not all fall within the same Church. The Armenian Apostolic Church 
was formed in 301CE, with the conversion en mass of the Armenian kingdom to Christianity. As part of the 
Orthodox branch of Christianity, it is autocephalic and forms one of the independent heads of Orthodox 
Christianity. During the 19th century, Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries to the Near East 
converted Armenian communities to their denominations. There are no agreed upon percentages of each 
denomination, but Bakalian estimates the breakdown in the US at 64.2% Apostolic, 9.7% Protestant, and 
3.8% Roman Catholic, with 22.3% either practicing “other” denominations or no religion. These estimates 
are taken from a large-n survey of Armenians in the New York/New Jersey area. Bakalian, pp. 64-65.     
27 Another version of why the Armenian Apostolics formed their own church is as follows: “One Sunday in 
1888, the [Protestant] minister Asadour Antreasian spoke disrespectfully about the Armenian Church, 
whereupon the faithful of the Armenian Apostolic Church got up and walked out in protest.” Archbishop 
Mesroh Ashjian, The Armenian Church in America (New York: Armenian Prelacy, 1985) p. 16. 
28 Phillips, pp. 128-130. 
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Armenian National Apostolic Church of America. In 1957, this church was placed under 
the jurisdiction of the Holy See of Cilicia, in Lebanon. 29  Twelve of the fifteen existing 
Apostolic churches remained under the authority of the Holy See of Etchmiadzin, in 
Soviet occupied Armenia.30 
 
The schism within the Armenian-American community played itself out not only 
in the churches but also in charities and social clubs. Prior to World War I and the 
Armenian Genocide, hundreds of Armenian charities existed in the US.31 Of particular 
importance was the creation of the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) in 
1906 by the wealthy Egyptian-Armenian Bohos Nubar Pasha.32 The aims of AGBU, 
which remain the same today, are education, vocational training, medical access, 
agricultural development, and aid to the orphaned and needy. 33 Armenian historian 
Robert Mirak argues that the AGBU, although intended to be non-partisan, was created 
by the anti-ARF community, and has remained largely partisan. 34 The creation of the 
AGBU prompted the ARF in 1910 to found the Armenian Red Cross, which later became 
the Armenian Relief Society (ARS). Current-day ARS headquarters, in Watertown, 
Massachusetts, are in the same building as other ARF organizations.35 In addition to 
bipartisan charities, social clubs were also divided along pro- and anti-ARF lines. The 
Armenian Youth Federation (AYF) was founded just weeks after the assassination of 
Archbishop Tourian and remains an important wing of the ARF.36 The anti-ARF 
community sponsors its own youth movements.37  
  
Alongside political, religious, and social organizations in the Armenian-American 
community, movements aimed at influencing US domestic and foreign policy also 
became an important part of Armenian diasporic life. Before Armenians formed their 
                                                 
29 Phillips, pp. 143-154 and Bakalian, p. 97. 
30 Phillips, p. 131. 
31There were a series of pogroms and massacres against the Armenians prior to the Genocide. The first 
massacre was ordered by the Ottoman authorities but carried out by Kurds in Sassun and Urfa from 1894-
1896. This was followed by the massacre of more than 6,000 Armenians in Constantinople in 1896. In 
addition, there were pogroms in Cilicia in 1909, following the “Yong Turk” coup in 1908. Each of these 
massacres produced waves of immigrants seeking asylum. The Genocide is marked as beginning on April 
24th, 1915, when “Armenian political, religious, educational, and intellectual leaders in Constantinople 
were arrested, deported to Anatolia, and put to death.” See Richard G. Hovannisian, “Etiology and 
Sequelae of the Armenian Genocide,” in Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, edited by 
George J. Andreopoulos (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) pp. 111-140. See also 
Nassibian, Chapter 1, “Britain and the Armenian Question on the Eve of the First World War.” For a 
summary of Armenian charities in the US, see Robert Mirak, Armenians In America, 1890 to World War 1  
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983) p. 173-174.  
32 Today the AGBU is reported as having a $300 million endowment, see Tololyan, “Elites and Institutions, 
p. 127. 
33 Mirak, pp. 175-176. See also the AGBU website, www.agbu.org. 
34 Phillips states; “The AGBU is a charitable and educational institution. Its loyalties have always lain with 
Soviet Armenia and the Church at Etchmiadzin. Although AGBU’ers insist that Tashnaks [ARF members] 
join their organization, I have yet to find one,” pp. 142-143. 
35 Although in an interview with this author an ARF activist insisted that neither the Armenian Red Cross 
nor the ARS is political (Interview 7/20/01). 
36 The AYF Legacy: Portrait of a Movement in Historical Review, 1933-1993 (Watertown: Armenian Youth 
Federation, 1994). 
37 See the Armenian Assembly’s website, www.aainc.org, and AGBU’s website, www.agbu.org. 
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own ethnic lobbies in Washington, early political activism on Armenian issues was 
largely instigated and orchestrated by non-Armenians. In particular, churches in the US 
and Great Britain launched campaigns after World War I to raise money for the “starving 
Armenians.”38  American and British missionaries to the region were also instrumental in 
raising awareness of Armenia and Armenian issues.39 In addition, women’s organizations 
such as the WCTU in Britain and the US took up the Armenian cause, sponsoring rallies 
and fundraisers, writing to politicians, and even traveling to areas where Armenian 
refugees were amassed to provide aid.40  
 
In addition to outside support, the Armenian-American community also 
confronted Washington with its concerns. The earliest Armenian political activism, 
somewhat ironically, was aimed at blocking Armenian immigration to the US. In the late 
1880s, Armenians in Worcester petitioned the “Turkish legislation in Washington” with 
the aim of blocking further immigration of Armenians. Economic hardships in the US 
and fears about the survival of an Armenian presence in the Old World inspired these 
measures. The petition succeeded in blocking 30 Armenians en route to the US.41 Prior to 
World War I, efforts by the AGBU, the ARF, and the Armenian National Assembly, an 
organization in Constantinople, sought to keep Armenians in the homeland by providing 
funds for subsistence and general discouragement of emigration. 42 
  
After the Genocide, Armenians in the US joined forces with other groups to 
thwart the restoration of economic and diplomatic ties between the US and the new 
Republic of Turkey.  The American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, a pro-
Armenian body of Congress members, clergy, charity organizations, and Armenian-
Americans, organized to block ratification of normalized relations with Turkey. 43 The 
Committee succeeded in preventing the treaty’s ratification in the Senate. In 1927, the 
State Department negotiated the restoration of ties between the two countries through an 
“exchange of notes” between diplomats.44  Despite rigorous opposition from members of 
the Committee, Turkey and America exchanged ambassadors in May of 1927, thus 
reestablishing diplomatic ties. The Senate approved these actions post facto in 1928.45  
                                                 
38 There were numerous drives within churches throughout the US and Britain aimed at raising money for 
Armenian refugees and orphans. A few examples include the “International Golden Rule Sunday,” 
sponsored by Near Eastern Relief and held annually on December 7, beginning in 1923. The aim was to 
raise funds for Assyrian, Armenian, Greek, Syrian and Jewis h orphans in the Near East. A similar effort, 
“Save the Starving in Bible Lands” was organized by the Sunday School War Council of the American 
Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief. Another example was the Churches of America and Near East 
Relief Ecumenical Cooperation , consisting of more than 20 denominations in the US and aimed at raising 
aid and awareness of refugees in the Near East, and drives within Sunday schools of several denominations. 
See “Armenian Pamphlets” Box, Widner Library, Harvard University, OTT 3453 02. For a description of 
British organizations that aided the Armenians, see Nassibian, chapters 4-6. 
39 James L. Barton, The Story of Near East Relief (1915-1930): An Interpretation, (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1930), Chapter 1 “How and Why it Began.”  
40 Nassibian, pp. 40-50, 58-61 and Mirak, pp. 68-70. 
41 Mirak, p. 44. 
42 Mirak, pp. 66-68. 
43 Roger R. Trask, The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971) pp. 37-38. 
44 Trask, pp. 49-51. 
45 Trask, pp. 54-60. 
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Pro-Armenian activism also mobilized to ensure Genocide survivors’ entrance to 
the US.  Beginning in the 1920s, Congress passed legislation aimed at restricting certain 
ethnic groups’ immigration to the US. In 1927, the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act was 
passed, placing a quota on immigration; the Armenian quota was set at 100 per annum. 46 
Armenian-Americans and other pro-Armenian groups fought to classify Armenians as 
refugees, which allowed them special entry into the US.47 After World War II, the 
American National Committee for Homeless Armenians (ANCHA) took similar 
measures, calling on the Displaced Persons Act.48 ANCHA succeeded in aiding 25,000 
Armenians’ immigration to the US, despite the quota system. 49 
  
Another important phase of political activism within the Armenian diaspora was 
the terrorist movement of the 1970s and early 1980s. The goal of Armenian terrorist acts 
was to agitate for Turkish and international recognition of the Armenian Genocide.50 Two 
main groups associated with the ARF, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of 
Armenia (ASALA) and the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA), assassinated Turkish 
officials to avenge those who died in the Genocide and to push for greater recognition of 
the Genocide.51 Terrorist activities later expanded to include acts like the murder of nine 
and injuring of 74 at Ankara’s airport in 1982 and the bombing of Orly Airport in Paris in 
1983, which killed six and injured 48.52 These acts, while gaining publicity for the 
Armenian cause, divided the Armenian diaspora over their methods and morality.53 
Terrorism lost its effectiveness as a political tool as the Armenian community and those 
within the ranks of the ARF became more divided over the costs and benefits of these 
acts.54 
 
In addition to these methods of political activism, the Armenians formed lobby 
groups aimed at influencing foreign policy in Washington. The ARF cites the American 
Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA), formed in 1918, as their first lobby 
group.55 Their current lobby organization, the Armenian National Committee of America 
(ANCA), evolved from the ACIA. In 1972, influential members in the anti-ARF 
community in the US founded the Armenian Assembly of America (the Assembly) with 
the hope of forming “a new Armenian organization in which leaders from various 
                                                 
46 Phillips, p. 104. 
47 ibid. 
48 Bakalian, p. 11. 
49 The quota system was liberalized in 1965. See Bakalian, p. 11. 
50 Khachig Tololyan, “Cultural Narrative and the Motivation of the Terrorist,” in The Journal of Strategic 
Studies, vol. 10 no. 4 (Dec. 1987), pp. 217-233. 
51 Tololyan, “Terrorist,” pp. 226-229. 
52 “Armenian Terrorism: That Beirut Virus,” The Economist, August 14, 1982, p. 46, and “The dream and 
the terror,” The Economist, July 23, 1983, p. 51, respectively. 
53 Bakalian, pp. 153-154. See also “UnArmenian Activities,” The Economist, February 6, 1982, p. 20. 
54 Interview with Dr. Khachig Tololyan and Khatchik Der Ghoukassian, 7/20/01. 
55 Garo Adanalian, “Pursing the Armenian Cause in the 21st Century: An Intervie w with Sharistan 
Ardhaldjian [of ANCA],” The Armenian Weekly Online, (May 2001), 
http:/free.freespeech.org/armnenian/weekly/may (downloaded 7/22/01). 
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Armenian groups would participate for the benefit of the community as a whole.”56 To 
date, these two lobby groups continue to function independently of one another.57 Their 
aims, strategies and achievements will be discussed below. 
 
IV. The Rise of Armenian Ethnic Lobbies 
  
The creation of Armenian ethnic lobbies in the US is another example of parallel 
organizations created by the ideological schism within the Armenian-American 
community. This section argues that competition between the two lobby groups—ANCA 
and the Assembly—has created hyper mobilization of resources within the Armenian-
American diaspora. Competition has promoted the causes and successes of Armenian 
lobby efforts because, although the two lobbies have different approaches to influencing 
Washington, they mostly agree on policy objectives. This section outlines three 
dimensions of these two lobby groups: the organizational essence of each group;58 their 
outreach projects; and their policy objectives.  
 
A.  Organizational Essence—History, Structure, Mobilization, and Alliances 
 
ANCA and the Assembly are very different organizations in their histories and 
goals. ANCA traces its origins back to the American Committee for the Independence of 
Armenia (ACIA), the organization that lobbied on behalf of the ARF-governed Republic 
of Armenia, beginning in 1918.59 As noted earlier, the Hunchags, the Progressive 
League, and those aligned with Noubar Pasha (the AGBU and, later, the Ramagavars) 
contested the ARF-run Armenian government. This contestation led to two delegations of 
Armenians at the post-World War I conferences of Versailles and Sèvres, and two 
delegations at the post-World War II conference in San Francisco. In the US, however, 
there was only one organized lobby group for Armenian issues, the ARF-backed ACIA 
and its successor ANCA. The presence of only one Armenian lobby group held until 
1972.  
 
In 1972, two Armenian-American professors at George Washington University 
hatched the idea of a new lobby group that would incorporate other already-existing 
Armenian organizations. These scholars, together with two Armenian attorneys from 
Boston, approached two prominent Armenian-American businessmen, Stephen Mugar 
and Hirair Hovnanian, who agreed to financially back the plan. 60 Their million-dollar 
                                                 
56 “About the Armenian Assembly,” Armenian Assembly of America website, 
http:/www.aainc.org/overview (downloaded on 7/22/01). 
57 Another article on Armenian lobby groups is: Rachel Anderson Paul, “Grassroots Mobilization and 
Diaspora Politics: Armenian Interest Groups and the Role of Collective Memory,” Nationalism and Ethnic 
Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1, (Spring, 2000), pp. 24-47. 
58 The term “organizational essence” is taken from Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign 
Policy, Chapter 3, “Organizational Interests” (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1974). 
59 Adanalian, p. 1. 
60 Hovnanian remains the chairperson of the board of trustees to this day. Armenian Assembly of America 
Annual Report 2000 , “Message from the Chairman of the Board of Trustees,” pp. 2, 25. The Armenian 
Assembly of America website, www.aaainc.org/overview (downloaded on 7/22/01).  
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donations were followed by numerous contributions from prominent Armenian-American 
professionals and business people.61 Today they boast “investments” of $13,134,187.62 
 
Although the Assembly named as one of its primary goals to create “an 
organization for all Armenian-Americans,” the founding of the Armenian Assembly of 
America is another chapter in the rivalry between pro- and anti-ARF groups in the United 
States. The key founding members were contributors to the AGBU, the largest remaining 
anti-ARF organization. Mugar, the creator of the Star Market chain in Massachusetts, 
was a prominent New England philanthropist who had donated large sums of money to 
Boston-area universities and the AGBU. 63 Richard Hovannisian, a prominent scholar of 
Armenian history and founding member of the Assembly, was also an active member of 
the AGBU.  
    
The differing goals of ANCA and the Armenian Assembly reflect the ideological 
split between the two groups. ANCA and the ARF define their overarching goal as “a 
unified, free, and independent Armenia.”64 This comes from the platform of the 1919 
ARF-headed Armenian government, which called for territorial and ethnic unification of 
Armenians in the region. 65 They also speak in terms of “a just solution to the Armenian 
Cause” (Hai Tahd in Armenian) and call for “a resolution of all the political, moral, and 
legal implications associated with [a just resolution].”66 From this imperative, ANCA 
delineates three main goals: “to foster public awareness in support of a free, united and 
independent Armenia; to influence and guide US policy on matters of interest to the 
Armenian-American community; and to represent the collective Armenian-American 
viewpoint on matters of public policy, while serving as liaison between the community 
and their elected officials.”67  
 
The Assembly’s goals, although less clearly stated than ANCA's, tend to parallel 
US foreign policy ideals. The Assembly states a primary goal as the “commitment to 
prevent genocide and promote human rights…”68 Another goal is “good governance” in 
Armenia, defined as “participatory democracy” and a market economy.69 The Assembly 
also names as a goal that Armenians in the homeland “not only survive in Armenia and 
Nagorno Karabagh, but flourish.”70 The AGBU shares in this last goal, emphasizing the 
prosperity of Armenians not just in the homeland but the worldwide diaspora.71 
 
                                                 
61 A list of the most generous benefactors to the endowment can be found in the Armenian Assembly of 
America: Membership Spotlight 2000 , p. 17, www.aaa.inc.org (downloaded on 7/22/01). 
62 Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report , p. 26. “Investments” is not further detailed. 
63 Phillips, p. 111. 
64 Adanalian, p. 1 and Hratch Dasnabedian, “The Evolution of the National and Political Objectives of the 
ARF,” p. 3, www.arf.am (downloaded on 7/19/01). 
65 Dasnabedian, pp. 2-3. 
66 Adanalian, p. 1. 
67 “About the Armenian National Committee of America,” p. 1, The ANCA website, www.anca.org, 
(downloaded on 3/11/01). 
68 Armenian Assembly of American Annual Report 2000, p. 3. 
69 Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000 , p. 2. 
70 ibid. 
71 AGBU Biennial Report, 1998-1999.  
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Another key difference between the two lobby groups is the way in which they 
are structured. Both organizations place their national headquarters in Washington, DC, 
and both organizations have offices in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, and Stepanakert, 
the capital of Nagorno Karabakh. ANCA’s structure is dispersed; it has numerous offices 
and chapters throughout the United States. There are Western and Eastern regional 
offices, in Glendale, California and Watertown, Massachusetts, respectively. The Eastern 
Regional Office coordinates 31 local offices west of the Mississippi. 72 The Western 
Regional office coordinates 12 offices, mostly in California.73  In addition, there are ANC 
offices in other countries including France, Italy, and Britain and a representative for the 
EU.74  
 
The Armenian Assembly, on the other hand, is more centralized than ANCA. In 
addition to its national headquarters in Washington, DC, it has a regional office in 
Beverly Hills, California. These two offices are responsible for all major efforts of the 
Assembly: policy issues, relations with the Armenian government, public affairs, 
membership, fundraising, and other projects.75 In addition to these main offices, there is a 
small office in Cambridge, Massachusetts that supports the Armenian Tree Project 
(ATP), a program aimed at planting agricultural and aesthetic trees in Armenia.76 The 
Assembly also has an office in New York that works with UN-related issues.77 
 
Furthermore, the two lobby groups’ approaches to mobilization are different. 
ANCA stresses its essence as a “bottom-up” organization. It claims to be “the largest and 
most influential Armenian-American grassroots political organization.”78 ANCA stresses 
as one of its primary goals the mobilization of support at the local level:  
 
The ANCA is convinced that a well-educated, motivated grassroots [sic] is the 
most valuable and powerful weapon we have…Each ANC is composed of 
community members…Each ANC is structured to meet the needs of its local 
community. 79  
 
ANCA boasts of “over 45 chapters in 25 states across the United States—each 
working to ensure that the Armenian American community’s collective voice is heard on 
the federal, state and local level.”80 
 
Primarily, the Assembly attracts and targets prominent Armenian-American 
professionals and businesspeople who support the lobby group financially.81 In addition 
                                                 
72 Adanalian, p. 2. 
73 “Chapter Contacts,” pp. 3-4, The ANCA website, www.anca.org (downloaded 7/2201). 
74 Alex Sadar, “A Year of Victories and Lessons for Hai Tahd,” in The Armenian Weekly Online (March, 
2001) http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly (downloaded 7/22/01). 
75 Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000. 
76 This project alone boasts 6,000 donors, Armenian Assembly Annual Report 2000, pp. 22-23. 
77 Armenian Assembly of American Annual Report 2000, p. 3. 
78 “ANCA profile,” p. 1, The ANCA website, www.anca.org, (downloaded 3/11/01). 
79 Adanalian, p. 2. 
80 “ANCA Offices and Chapters,” p. 1, The ANCA website, www.anca.org (downloaded on 3/11/01). 
81 Bakalian, p. 140. 
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to maintaining intense fundraising efforts, the Assembly launched a grassroots program, 
the Armenian-American Action Committee (ARAMAC). The Armenian Assembly of 
America Annual Report 2000 cites “almost 8,000 Armenian-American activists across the 
country.”82  
 
Lastly, ANCA and the Assembly have formed separate alliances with other 
organizations and interest groups.  ANCA names “coalition building” as essential to its 
effectiveness. An ANCA representative states: “The ANCA has longstanding ties to the 
Greek, [Greek] Cypriot, Kurdish, and Lebanese communities. We also work with various 
labor and human rights organizations.”83 These alliances have been particularly useful for 
ANCA’s bid to block military and economic aid to Turkey based on human rights 
violations of Armenians, Kurds, and Greek Cypriots. This will be further discussed 
below.  
 
The Assembly boasts a strong and unique tie with the United Nations, with which 
it claims to have “the highest non-governmental organization status of any Armenian 
organization.”84 In 1997, the Assembly’s NGO Training and Resource Center (NGOC) 
launched a new initiative with UNHCR to “build the capacity of NGO’s dealing with 
refugee problems…through a combination of training, technical assistance, assessments, 
and grants.”85  In 1999, the Assembly was given special consultative status at the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council.86 In addition, the Assembly claims a unique 
relationship with the US Holocaust Memorial Museum and works closely with its staff to 
raise awareness on issues of genocide.87 
 
 
B.  Outreach Projects 
 
Although the histories, structures, approaches to mobilization, and alliances are 
different between ANCA and the Assembly, their programs of outreach to Armenians 
and the general public are similar. Both organizations have created parallel publications, 
research institutes, and youth programs. This redundancy has doubled the resources to 
Armenians and the general public, thus making Armenian issues more salient and 
arguably engaging more Armenians than would have otherwise been mobilized by one 
set of organizations alone. 
 
A key means of mobilization for both lobby groups and their sibling organizations 
are publications. ANCA uses a website and emails to inform its constituents and circulate 
its position papers.88 ANCA also publishes the monthly “TransCaucasus: A Chronology,” 
which is available on their website. In addition, they have close ties with the Hairenik 
                                                 
82 Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000 , p. 7. 
83 Adanalian, p. 1. 
84 Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000 , p. 3. 
85 Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000 , p. 20. 
86 Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000 , p. 21. 
87 Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000 , p. 24. 
88 ANCA website, www.anca.org, (downloaded 3/11/01). 
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and Armenian Weekly newspapers, also available online.89  The ARF publishes the 
bilingual daily Azbarez, founded in 1908, and boasts a circulation of over 500,000, in 
addition to website readers.90 The ARF also publishes the daily Yerik in Armenia.91   
 
The Assembly also uses newsletters, emails, “action alerts,” and their websites to 
inform “government officials, members of Congress, scholars, foreign policy analysts,” 
and Armenian-Americans of important issues.92 Links listed on the Assembly’s website 
include Massis Weekly, Armenian Liberty, Snark New Agency, and the Armenian News 
Network .93 In addition, the Assembly provides a link to Azbarez Newspaper, the official 
newspaper of the ARF, one of the few cross-schism links on either side’s websites.94 The 
AGBU publishes AGBU Magazine quarterly and boasts a circulation of 80,000.95 It also 
publishes the quarterly Ararat and several other periodicals in French, Armenian and 
Spanish. 96 
 
Another means of outreach are US research institutes devoted to Armenian issues.  
The Zoryan Institute for Contemporary Armenian Research and Documentation, Inc. was 
founded in 1982 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. It was conjoined with the Zoryan Institute 
of Canada in 1984.97 The Institute names as its goals the “documentation, study, and 
dissemination of material related to the life of the Armenian people in the recent past and 
present, and within the context of larger world affairs.”98 Specifically, it focuses on three 
areas of study: the Genocide, the diaspora, and Armenia. With the University of Toronto 
the Institute co-publishes Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, a quarterly 
journal. It also holds seminars on Armenian issues, collects data and archival material, 
and makes its resources open to “scholars, writers, journalists, film-makers, government 
agencies, and other responsible organizations by special arrangement.”99 The Institute is 
funded by private donations from “‘well-educated professionals’ and ‘business 
owners.’”100  
 
The Assembly founded the Armenian National Institute (ANI) in 1997 with the 
goal of raising public awareness on the Armenian Genocide and seeking legal retribution 
                                                 
89 Adanalian, p. 3. 
90 “About Azbarez Armenian Daily Newspaper,” p. 1, Azbarez website, www.asbarez.com, (downloaded 
on 7/18/01). 
91 “President of Armenia Bans Leading Opposition Party,” ARF website, www.arf.am/English/History, 
(downloaded on 7/18/01) p. 1. 
92 Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000 , p. 10. See also Mary C. Cook, “An Interview with 
ARAMAC’s Grassroots Director Nancy Yerian Hiteshue,” pp. 1-3, Via Dolorosa Magazine, www.via -
dolorosa.net, (downloaded on 8/9/01).  
93 www.aaainc.org/links.htm (downloaded on 7/22/01). 
94 ibid. One other cross-link is the listing of the Zoryan Institute on the ANI’s website, www.armenian-
genocide.org/links.htm (downloaded on 8/8/01). 
95 AGBU Biennial Report, 1998-1999, p. 8. 
96 AGBU Biennial Report, 1998-1999, pp. 8-9. 
97 “About Us,” The Zoryan Institute website, pg. 1, www.zoryan.org, (downloaded on 7/24/01). 
98 ibid. 
99 “About Us: Services,” p. 3, Zoryan Institute website, www.zoryan.org, (downloaded on 7/24/01). 
100 Quote taken from Bakalian, p. 143. 
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for victims of the Genocide.101 To this end it holds conferences and forums on the 
Genocide. ANI is currently collaborating with the Facing History and Ourselves 
Foundation on a project aimed at developing school curricula on the Genocide. In 
addition, ANI is working on The Encyclopedia of Genocide, in collaboration with 
Holocaust scholars. ANI claims a special relationship with the US Holocaust Memorial 
Museum, with which it is working to develop the Armenian Holocaust Museum and 
Memorial in Washington, DC.102     
 
Mobilizing Armenian-American youth is another important feature of both lobby 
groups. ANCA and the ARF support the Armenian Youth Federation (AYF), which was 
founded in 1933. The AYF names its primary goal as “hayabahbanoum” or “keeping 
Armenians Armenian” and “instilling in them pride in their heritage.”103 The AYF 
achieves these ends through education on Armenian history and issues, annual Olympics 
between different regions and chapters of the organization, language courses, political 
activism, and cultural functions.104 In addition, they have a summer camp, Camp 
Haiastan, which hosts hundreds of young Armenian-Americans each year. They also 
offer college scholarships for its members. In addition, ANCA supports an internship 
program within its major offices for college-aged Armenian-Americans.105  
 
The Assembly offers several programs geared at motivating Armenian-American 
youth. They have a summer internship program, launched in 1997, that pairs college 
students with members of Congress, federal agencies, NGOs, “media outlets,” and think 
tanks.106 In 1999, the Assembly began a summer internship program that places 
Armenian-American students in offices in Yerevan. 107 In addition, the AGBU offers 
several programs that target youth and young professionals. They run 24 primary, 
secondary, and preparatory schools in addition to international “Saturday schools” that 
teach Armenian history, culture, and language, including six in the United States.108 They 
offer scholarships internationally and a special graduate student loan program in the 
United States.109 The AGBU have a Young Professional’s Club, established in Los 
Angeles in 1995, aimed at creating an international network of young Armenian 
professionals and linking that network with young professionals in Armenia.110 In 
addition, they also hold a biennial international athletics event and a have summer camp, 
Camp Nubar, in New York and several other camps internationally. 111 See chart A for a 
summary of Armenian-American resources. 
 
                                                 
101 Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report , p. 24. See also ANI’s website, www.armenian-
genocide.org.  
102 ibid. 
103 The AYF Legacy, p. 5. 
104 The AYF Legacy, Chapter 1 “The AYF at 60: A pictorial history of the AYF,” pp. 3-23. 
105 Adanalian, p. 2. 
106 Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000 , p. 19. 
107 Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000 , pp. 9, 19. 
108 AGBU Biennial Report, 1998-1999, p. 6. 
109 AGBU Biennial Report, 1998-1999, p. 7. 
110 AGBU Biennial Report, 1998-1999, pp. 7-8. 
111 AGBU Biennial Report, 1998-1999, p. 8. 
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Finally, it is important to note that the devastating earthquake that hit Armenia on 
December 7, 1988 mobilized both sides of the Armenian-American community for 
political and humanitarian action. The earthquake has been named as a key turning point 
in the mobilization of the Armenian diaspora for the homeland. One scholar notes: 
“Many men and women of Armenian descent who had not been active in communal 
structures brought in their contributions.”112 For example, famous Hollywood attorney 
Paul Krekorian first got involved with the Armenian community in Los Angeles in 
response to the earthquake. Today he is an active political and social advocate for 
Armenian issues  
and supports the efforts of the Armenian Assembly and the AGBU. 113 In addition, both 
lobby groups rallied for US aid to help the survivors.114 Various Armenian and non-
Armenian charities also organized fundraisers. There was even an attempt to send 
building materials to the region for reconstruction. 115 
                                                 
112 Bakalian, p. 162. 
113 Lisa Boghosian Papas, “People and Programs: The New Generation Taking Cues from their Ancestors, 
Young Armenians are Shaking the Scene,” pp. 1-8, AGBU Website, www.agbu.org, (downloaded on 
7/24/01). 
114 Bakalian, p. 141. 
115 “Eastern Europe’s Diasporas: The Homecoming,” The Economist, December 26, 1992, pp. 73-80. 
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Chart A: Armenian-American Lobby Groups and Their Resources 
 
 ANCA The Assembly 
History Lobbying Arm of ARF Largely from the AGBU 
Charities ARS AGBU 
Primary Goal “Unified, Free and 
Independent Armenia” 
Democracy, economic 
development, Prosperity 
Targets of mobilization Grass-roots Initially money generating 
elites, added grass-roots 
(ARAMAC) in 1990s 
Alliances Kurds, Greeks, Greek 
Cypriots, Unions 
US Holocaust Memorial 
Museum, UN 
Youth Programs (with ARF) 
§ AYF, 1933 
§ Summer camp 
§ Internships 
§ Scholarships 
§ Olympics 
 
(with AGBU) 
§ Schools 
§ Summer camp 
§ Young Professionals’ 
Club 
§ Internships 
§ Scholarships 
§ International Athletics 
Research Zoryan Institute, 1982 
 
Armenian National 
Institute, 1997 
Publications § Website, position-
papers, action alerts 
§ Transcaucus: A 
Chronology 
§ Hairenik 
§ Armenian Weekly 
§ Azbarez (ARF) 
§ Yerik 
§ Website, position-
papers, action alerts 
§ AGBU Magazine 
§ Ararat Quarterly 
Congressional groups § Bipartisan Caucus 
§ Democratic Council 
§ Republican Council 
§ Key Congressional 
members 
§ Bipartisan Caucus 
§ Democratic Council 
§ Republican Council 
§ Key Congressional 
members 
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 All of these efforts predate the republic’s independence in 1991. The US diaspora, 
therefore, was well mobilized to support lobbying efforts for the newly independent 
Armenia in the 1990s. 
 
C.  Congress and Policy Objectives, Strategies and Tactics 
 
Despite their differences in histories, goals, structure, and approaches to 
mobilization, the lobbying efforts of ANCA and the Assembly are united in Washington 
by two important factors: a bipartisan Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues, and 
similar policy objectives. The bipartisan Armenian Caucus, which has grown to 95 
members in the 107th Congress, was initiated in January of 1995 by Democrat Frank 
Pallone of New Jersey and Republican Edward Porter of Illinois, now succeeded by 
Republican Joe Knollenberg of Michigan. 116 The Caucus works within the House of 
Representatives to encourage initiatives for Armenia and Armenian issues.117 There is a 
tight correlation between members of the Caucus and votes to support issues pertaining to 
Armenia, particularly the maintenance of Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, 
which blocks aid to Armenia’s rival Azerbaijan. 118 This will be discussed further below. 
 
In addition to the Armenian Caucus in the Congress, there is the Armenian-
American Democratic Leadership Council, which posts links to both ANCA and the 
Assembly on its website, and the Armenian-American Republican Council, founded in 
1997 in Los Angeles.119 Moreover, there have been a few key advocates of Armenian 
issues on Capital Hill, most notably former Senator Robert Dole, who was chair of the 
Senate Finance Committee and served as Senate majority leader. Dole, whose life was 
saved in World War II by an Armenian doctor, rallied the Armenian cause for decades. 
He consistently called for US official recognition of the Genocide, proposing resolutions 
in the Senate from 1982 until his retirement in 1996. In May of 2001, Dole was presented 
with the ANCA Lifetime Achievement Award for his dedication to the Armenian 
cause.120 
 
These unifying lobbying bodies are further strengthened by the current policy 
objectives of ANCA and the Assembly, which are nearly identical. Their policy demands 
can be broken down into six objectives.  First, both lobbies are working towards the US 
government’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1922. Second, both groups 
want US government recognition of Nagorno Karabakh’s independence and US aid to the 
exclave. Third, the lobbies have fought vigorously for the maintenance of Section 907 of 
the Freedom Support Act, which prevents the US from extending aid to Azerbaijan. 
Fourth, both groups lobby for continued US aid to Armenia. Two additional items, 
blockading arms sales to Turkey and challenging the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline, appear to be 
more rigorously pursued by ANCA than by the Assembly.  
                                                 
116 “Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues,” p. 1, The Armenian Assembly of America website, 
www.aaainc.org, (downloaded on 7/22/01). 
117 ibid and the Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report 2000, p. 5. 
118 See appendix A. 
119 The AADLC website, www.aadlc.org, (downloaded on 7/22/01). The Armenian Republicans do not 
provide links to either lobby group.  http://members.aol.com/aarc2000/info.html, (downloaded on 8/8/01). 
120 Correspondence with ANCA ER office, (5/18/01). 
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1. US Recognition of the Armenian Genocide 
 
Both ANCA and the Assembly name US recognition of the Genocide as one of 
their primary policy objectives.121 ANCA is much more vocal on demands for territory 
and reparations from Turkey than is the Assembly, however.122 Since 1982, both lobby 
groups have fought for the passage of legislation that would officially recognize the 
Armenian Genocide of 1915-1922 and honor its victims with a Day of Remembrance on 
April 24th. Each year the Resolution has been thwarted, usually with the claim that 
recognizing the Genocide will strain relations with Turkey and threaten strategic security 
interests of the US.123 Although both lobby groups are rigorously campaigning for US 
recognition of the Genocide, each group employs different strategies and tactics for 
pressuring the resolution’s passage. 
 
ANCA, in keeping with its grassroots approach to mobilization, employs a 
“bottom up” strategy towards attaining US recognition of the Armenian Genocide. In 
addition to lobbying for its official recognition on Capital Hill, ANCA also lobbies at the 
state and city level for recognition and the Day of Remembrance. Currently 30 states 
recognize the Genocide.124 In addition, several cities, such as Boston, recognize the 
Genocide and hold April 24th as a Day of Remembrance.125 ANCA also employs the 
tactic of ga ining other countries’ recognition of the Genocide to pressure the US to follow 
suit. ANC chapters around the globe claim success in pressuring the governments of 
France, Italy, the EU, the European parliament, Great Britain, Greece, Belgium, Lebanon, 
Russia, the UN, Cyprus, Canada, and Argentina to recognize the Genocide.126 Moreover, 
the ANC of the EU is trying to tie Turkey’s full inclusion in the EU to their recognition 
of the Genocide.127  ANCA is also openly critical of the state of Israel for its alliance with 
Turkey and what it sees as lack of support for recognition of the Armenian Genocide.128  
   
The Assembly, in addition to its lobbying efforts among members of Congress, 
concentrates its efforts on increasing documentation surrounding the Armenian Genocide. 
The Assembly sponsors the Armenian National Institute (ANI), a center dedicated to 
“achieving recognition and affirmation of the Genocide.”129  In 2000, ANI held a 
                                                 
121 Sadar, p. 1, and The Armenian Assembly of America Annual Report, 2000 , pp.2-3. 
122 David B. Boyaijian, “Genocide Acknowledgement: Why Turkey and the State Department Fear It,” The 
Armenian Weekly Online, March 2001, pp. 1-2,  http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly (downloaded 
on 7/22/01). 
123 “Position Papers: Armenian Genocide Commemoration,” ANCA website, www.anca.org (downloaded 
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124 “Bush Breaks Pledge to Recognize Armenian Genocide,” The Armenian Weekly Online, May 2001, p. 2, 
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conference in Washington titled “The American Response to the Armenian Genocide,” 
which included scholars and members of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum.130 ANI is 
also working on legal action that will require insurance companies to pay surviving 
members of genocide victims, similar to Jewish legal demands for Holocaust 
restitution. 131 In addition, ANI has developed a curriculum on the Armenian Genocide 
and the Assembly is lobbying for its inclusion in US public schools.132 In 2000, the 
Assembly launched a project aimed at building an Armenian Genocide Museum and 
Memorial. Through the donations of two prominent Armenian-Americans, the Assembly 
purchased a 1925 building on the corner of 14th and G Street in Washington, DC, two 
blocks from the White House.133 The Assembly has made the Museum one of its top 
priorities. 
 
2. Nagorno Karabakh 
 
Beginning in February of 1988, Armenians in the Soviet Republic of Armenia 
took to the streets over toxic nuclear and chemical plants near the Soviet Republic’s 
capital of Yerevan. 134 This unrest quickly spread to include demands for the union of 
Nagorno Karabakh—a predominantly Armenian exclave given to neighboring Azerbaijan 
in 1921—with the Armenian republic.135 On February 28th, after Armenians in Karabakh 
voted to separate from Azerbaijan, racial rioting in the Azeri city of Sumgait killed 
between 35 and 350 people, mostly Armenians.136 This unleashed further violence 
between Armenians and Azeris in the region, prompting the flow of at least 600,000 
refugees between the two republics.137 The conflict escalated into all-out war after the 
two republics declared their independence in 1991.  Armenian fighters succeeded in 
defending Nagorno Karabakh and seizing an additional ten percent of Azerbaijan, 
including the “Lachin Corridor,” which connects Karabakh to Armenia.138 In 1994, Azeri 
and Karabakh officers agreed to a Russian-sponsored cease-fire.139 Currently the conflict 
remains unresolved, with Armenia occupying Azeri land and Azerbaijan and Turkey 
imposing a blockade on landlocked Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. The most recent 
attempts to negotiate a solution were the Key West talks in April of 2001. 
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Both ANCA and the Assembly are lobbying for the US to recognize the 
independence of Nagorno Karabakh and for increased aid to the exclave. ANCA, 
however, appears much more invested in the struggle for Karabakh than is the Assembly.  
ANCA is actively pushing for recognition of Karabakh’s right to self-determination and 
claims success in gaining its recognition from the states of Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island.140 Sharistan Ardhaldjian, an ANCA chairperson, states: 
 
Any power that would deny [Armenians in Karabakh] their right to self-
determination—anyone who would like to see Karabagh remain a part of 
Azerbaijan—cannot be considered an honest broker in our view, because that 
would mean ignoring history, rewarding aggression and human rights violations, 
and denying the inalienable rights of individuals and collectives to be free.141  
 
In addition to lobbying for Karabakh’s recognition, the ARF is highly invested in 
the government of Karabakh. Karabakh was an ARF stronghold in the early 1990s after 
the first elections in Armenia failed to bring the ARF back to power.142  Moreover, 
Armenians in the diaspora, reportedly aligned with the ARF, actually returned to the 
region to fight for Karabakh’s liberation from Azeri control and reunification with 
Armenia.143 It is also reported that Armenians in California and France helped fund arms 
transfers to Karabakh. 144 ANCA's and ARF’s efforts to attain independence for 
Karabakh, therefore, are considerable, including both official lobbying channels and 
unofficial support of men and materiel. 
 
The Assembly lobbies for the Karabakh cause through other means. The Annual 
Report 2000 commits only two paragraphs specifically to Nagorno Karabakh, in which it 
calls its office in Stepanakert a “point of contact for senior government officials, leaders 
and local representatives of international organizations, visiting American lawmakers, 
and Armenian and foreign journalists.”145 Elsewhere in its annual report, the Assembly 
stresses its commitment to “confidence building measures” between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan including “studies of energy routes, regional transportation routes, water 
management, and other collaborative and humanitarian initiatives.”146 The Assembly’s 
approach to the Karabakh conflict, therefore, is far less direct than ANCA’s, adopting a 
cooperative and conciliatory tone towards the issue. 
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3. Section 907 
 
The maintenance of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act is the strongest 
evidence of Armenian lobbying success. The Freedom Support Act was passed in 1992 to 
provide US financial and technical assistance to former Soviet states.147 Section 907 was 
passed as an addendum of the Freedom Support Act; it specifically prohibits Azerbaijan 
from receiving US aid as long as Azeri hostilities towards Armenians continue and the 
Azeri blockade against Armenia persists.148 Section 907 has remained in place, despite 
rigorous campaigning from opposition lobbies, most notably 14 oil companies, the 
Turkish Caucus, and pro-Israel lobbies.149 These groups promote abolition of Section 907 
and the full implementation of the Silk Road Strategy Act, which calls for support to 
Azerbaijan and neighboring central Asian states, particularly to develop their economies 
in order to balance against Iran, China, and the threat of Islamic fundamentalism.150 In 
1999, Section 907 barely survived a vote in the Senate.151 In October of 2001, in light of 
September 11, the Senate passed a bill with near unanimity that “allows the President to 
waive the restriction of assistance for Azerbaijan if the President determines that it is in 
the national security interest of the United States to do so.”152 In particular, it is argued 
that countering the spread of militant Islam supercedes all other regional concerns.  The 
Foreign Aid Bill for FY 2003 gave the President the ability to waive Section 907 
indefinitely if he so chose.153  In late January 2002, President Bush exercised this option 
and, despite intense Armenian resistance, opened the door to potential American aid for 
Azerbaijan. 154 
 
Both ANCA and the Assembly rigorously lobbied for the creation of Section 907 
in 1992 and continue to lobby for its maintenance. Both lobby groups use similar 
strategies and tactics to ensure 907’s survival, namely bipartisan congressional backing 
and letter writing campaigns to encourage support of the Section. On March 28, 2001, 
ANCA representative Aram Sarafian testified before the House Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations in support of Section 907, stating: 
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The ANCA supports the law restricting US assistance to the government of 
Azerbaijan and actively opposes any effort to weaken, waive, or eliminate this 
prohibition. Any effort to circumvent the intent of this provision of law, particularly 
during the ongoing negotiations, will be viewed by the Azerbaijani government as a 
clear signal for renewed aggression. 155 
 
The Assembly also rigorously backs Section 907 stating: “Section 907 places 
reasonable restrictions on US assistance to the Government of Azerbaijan while it 
continues to blockade Armenia and Nagorno Karabagh…Despite various attempts to 
further weaken Section 907, the Assembly and our allies in Congress were able to 
maintain Section 907 in its current form.”156      
  
There is a tight correlation between members of the Armenian Caucus and those 
voting to uphold Section 907. In particular, a September 1998 vote in the House to repeal 
Section 907, which was defeated, shows a close correlation between Caucus members 
and votes to defeat the amendment of Section 907.157 Therefore alliances formed through 
the Caucus appear to provide strong support for legislation that supports Armenian 
causes. In contrast, financial contributions, such as Political Action Committee (PAC) 
donations to Congressional candidates, appear to have had little influence on voting 
behavior on Section 907. Oil PACs contributed, on average, $6,870,672 biennially to 
members of Congress, whereas Armenian PACs contributed only $26,681 biennially.158  
Therefore, the success of Armenian lobbies in maintaining Section 907 does not appear to 
be driven by financial contributions. 
 
4. Aid to Armenia 
 
Securing US financial and technical aid to the liberated Republic of Armenia has 
been a priority of both ANCA and the Armenian Assembly. The push for aid to the 
republic was prompted by the December 7, 1988 earthquake that killed over 25,000 
Armenians, injured 19,000 and left more that 500,000 homeless.159 In addition to raising 
money for the victims of the earthquake, both ANCA and the Assembly lobbied for 
federal aid to the fledgling republic, particularly as Azerbaijan and Turkey imposed 
blockades on Armenia, stunting the reconstruction process.160 Both ANCA and the 
Assembly claim credit for securing a minimum of $90 million to Armenia and Nagorno 
Karabakh annually, earning Armenia the nick-name the “Israel of the Caucuses.” In 
1999, Congress attempted to reduce Armenian aid to $75 million. Through the efforts of 
the Caucus, the $90 million minimum was maintained.161 In 2001, the lobby groups 
claimed victory in persuading the US Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign 
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Operations to maintain the $90 million for Armenia.  In fact, the FY 2003 Foreign Aid 
Bill kept the $90 million in economic aid while adding, for the first time, military aid 
totaling more than $4 million. 162  
 
ANCA, the Assembly, and their sibling organizations raise and secure aid for 
Armenia in similar ways.  On March 28, 2001, an ANCA representative testified before 
the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations regarding Armenian 
issues. He stated: 
The ANCA supports at least the same percentages of funding for the southern 
Caucasus region and Armenia as in fiscal year 2000…This appropriation will help 
offset the devastating effects of the Turkish and Azerbaijani blockades and help 
continue Armenia’s political and economic transition. Specifically…[US aid will 
support] the economy and infrastructure, further strengthen democratic 
institutions, and meet the country’s current development and humanitarian 
needs.163 
 
ANCA claims credit for the maintenance of aid to Armenia and Nagorno 
Karabakh through its efforts to “educate” the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Foreign Operations and through its grassroots approach of encouraging Armenians 
nationwide to contact members of congress and encourage them to back aid legislation. 164 
 
The Assembly also claims success for the level and maintenance of aid to 
Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. In addition to the $90 million annually, the Assembly 
takes credit for securing an additional $15 million as a “start-up fund” for a Synchrotron 
Light Source Particle Accelerator (SESAME).165 The AGBU has also received a federal 
grant of $9 million to go toward the endowment of the American University of Armenia 
in Yerevan. 166  In addition, the Assembly initiated an NGO Training and Resource Center 
(NGOC) in 1994, which seeks to “help Armenians and their recently established 
organizations shape positive social, political and economic transformation in 
Armenia.”167 Since its inception, NGOC has provided 140 micro-grants to regional 
NGOs to implement projects.168 
 
5. Block Arms Deals to Turkey and Caspian Pipeline Project 
 
There are two principal policy objectives for which ANCA appears to be 
lobbying: blocking arms deals to Turkey and withholding US taxpayer funding for the 
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Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline, which bypasses Armenia. As a NATO ally, Turkey is the 
recipient of considerable military aid from the US. ANCA, together with Kurdish and 
Greek lobby groups, have called for the suspension of US military and economic aid to 
Turkey under the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act, designed to block aid to any country 
that obstructs US aid to a third country. 169 Turkey, together with Azerbaijan, is cited as 
imposing a blockade on Armenia that prevents humanitarian assistance from reaching 
people in these areas.  ANCA further calls for withholding military aid to Turkey under 
the Code of Conduct legislation, which restricts arms sales based on human rights abuses. 
Specifically, ANCA names Turkey’s denial of the Armenian Genocide, their treatment of 
Kurds, the blockade on Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, their occupation of Northern 
Cyprus, and their treatment of Christians within their borders as grounds for prohibiting 
arms sales.170  
 
More recently, ANCA has launched a campaign aimed at thwarting US aid to 
build a pipeline that would transport oil from the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan to the 
port of Ceyhan in Turkey. The Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline has been a US prospect since the 
early 1990s, but the aims of the second Bush administration to develop new sources of 
energy have renewed interest in the project.171 ANCA opposes the pipeline because it 
bypasses Armenian territory, thus denying the state revenue from transport fees. Four 
congressional members of the Armenian Caucus introduced House Resolution 162 in 
June of 2001.  It calls for: not subsidizing any pipeline that would prevent integration of 
Armenia into the region; a feasibility study of cost and efficiency of routes including a 
trans-Armenian route; and an evaluation of the pipeline’s cost efficiency. 172 See Chart B 
for a summary of Armenian-American policy objectives. 
 
In sum, despite their differences, ANCA and the Assembly present a unified front 
in Washington. Armenian lobbying efforts are strengthened by two factors. First, the 
groups have important congressional allies, most notably the bipartisan House Armenian 
Caucus, Democratic and Republican Armenian groups, and key members of Congress 
sympathetic to Armenian issues. Second, the presence of allies is strengthened by the 
Armenian lobbies’ unified policy objectives: recognition of the genocide, independence 
and aid for Nagorno Karabakh, maintenance of Section 907, and aid to Armenia. 
However, despite unity in objectives, the methods for attaining these policy goals do 
differ between ANCA and the Assembly.  The result is varying means concentrated on 
similar ends, arguably increasing the exposure and effectiveness of Armenian lobbying 
on Capitol Hill. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
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The success of this small ethnic minority in achieving its policy goals suggests the 
following about US ethnic lobbies in general. First, the size of an ethnic group does not 
necessarily determine its ability to influence the foreign policy process in the US. 
Armenians are few relative to other ethnic groups and yet have achieved remarkable 
lobbying success. This further suggests, in response to Smith’s first hypothesis, that 
electoral politics are not the most important factor for determining an ethnic group’s 
influence in Washington. The Armenian- American population is small in number and 
concentrated in a few locations, such as southern California, Massachusetts, parts of New 
York and New Jersey, and with small constituencies in Florida and Illinois. Therefore, 
concentrations of Armenians have only a slight impact on a few congressional elections.  
 
Second, in response to Smith’s second hypothesis that ethnic lobbies gain 
influence through campaign finance, the Armenian case demonstrates that an ethnic 
lobby group need not have vast sums of money to assert influence in Washington. The oil 
lobbies vastly outspend the Armenians in PAC contributions, and yet the Armenian 
lobbies have continued to keep legislation in place that prevents federal funds from 
aiding oil exploration and production in Azerbaijan. Armenian lobbies, therefore, exert 
their influence by means other than campaign finance. 
 
Third, Armenian lobby success does appear to be dependent on its high degree of 
organization, its clearly stated policy demands, and its alliance building within Congress, 
such as the Armenian House Caucus, and its networking with other lobbies and 
organizations. In addition, the Armenian’s ability to hyper-mobilize support both among 
its constituents and within Washington, aided by internal competition between a divided 
community, has contributed to its lobbying efforts. Together with its external allies, the 
Armenians have secured considerable lobbying success in Washington.  
 
 Fourth, US attention to Armenia does not appear to be dependent on that 
country’s democratic practices. US aid to Armenia began with the earthquake of 1988 
and has continued through the 1990s. The Armenian government has a spotty record for 
democratic practices. They have supported an armed uprising in Nagorno Karabakh that 
has resulted in the occupation of ten-percent of Azerbaijan in addition to the Armenian 
exclave. Furthermore, the government has been plagued with corruption problems, it has 
banned and jailed key members of the ARF from 1994-1998, and has censored the media. 
These are not the workings of a liberal democracy.  
Chart B: Policy Objectives and Methods 
 
 
 ANCA Assembly 
Recognition of the 
Genocide 
§ State and City level 
§ International 
Recognition 
§ Demanding land and 
reparations 
§ Cooperate with US 
Holocaust Museum 
§ Armenian Holocaust 
Museum 
§ Insurance claims 
Nagorno Karabakh § Lobby for US § Lobby for US 
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recognition and aid 
§ Lobby for international 
recognition 
§ State recognition of 
independence 
§ Eventual Reunification 
§ Men and materiel to 
fight for independence 
recognition and aid 
Section 907 § Bipartisan backing for 
maintenance 
§ Bipartisan backing for 
maintenance 
Aid to Armenian § Minimum $90 million 
through bipartisan 
backing 
§ Minimum $90 million 
through bipartisan 
backing 
§ Additional federal aid 
through AGBU projects 
Block Baku-Ceyhan 
Pipeline 
§ Call for Armenia to be 
included in the pipeline 
project 
§ Call for feasibility study 
for alternate routes 
 
Block arms deals with 
Turkey 
§ Work in alliance with 
Kurds, Greeks and 
Greek Cypriots 
§ Cite human rights 
violations as grounds 
for denial 
§ Cite blockade on 
Armenia as grounds for 
denial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If Armenia is being rewarded for its potential as a liberal democracy then this 
logic could apply to any number of new states, including Azerbaijan. Therefore, it is 
difficult to argue that Armenia is being supported because of its democratic practices in 
the region.  
 
Lastly, overall, the Armenian case does suggest that ethnic lobby groups can sway 
US foreign policy goals. US interests in the Caucuses do not demand favoring Armenia 
over its neighbors, yet pro-Armenian voices in Congress have succeeded in pushing 
through considerable aid to the country and legislation punishing to its enemies. The 
maintenance of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which clearly favors Armenia 
over Azerbaijan, is the strongest evidence of Armenian influence on US foreign policy 
legislation. The high level of US foreign aid to Armenia, which has only 3 million 
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citizens, is also strong evidence in support of Armenian lobbies and their congressional 
allies’ impact on US foreign policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Votes to Uphold Section 907, 105th Congress 
 
 
 
 
Caucus Y    Other Y     Caucus N     Other N     Caucus Abstention   Other Abstention 
        65              166                4                178                        3                          18 
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Appendix B: Armenian and PAC* Oil Contributions 
 
 
Year 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 
Armenian 29010 75 35525 43355 20250 57550 1000 
Oil 7564589 8969450 6674857 7892568 8222798 6977585 1792857 
 
Total Votes for House 
Ammendment 902
Caucus Y
Other Y
Caucus N
Other N
Caucus
Abstentions 
Other
Abstentions 
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Armenian Vs. Oil PAC Contributions
0
1000000
2000000
3000000
4000000
5000000
6000000
7000000
8000000
9000000
10000000
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001
Armenian
Oil
 
 
*Political Action Committee. 
PAC statistics reflect only contributions to those in Congress. 
PAC statistics taken from opensecrets.org and Political Money Line. 
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